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Statistical mechanics determines the abundance of different arrangements of matter depending
on cost-benefit balances. Its formalism and phenomenology percolate throughout biological pro-
cesses and set limits to effective computation. Under specific conditions, self-replicating and com-
putationally complex patterns become favored, yielding life, cognition, and Darwinian evolution.
Neurons and neural circuits sit at a crossroads between statistical mechanics, computation, and
(through their role in cognition) natural selection. Can we establish a statistical physics of neural
circuits? Such theory would tell what kinds of brains to expect under set energetic, evolutionary,
and computational conditions. With this big picture in mind, we focus on the fate of duplicated
neural circuits. We look at examples from central nervous systems, with a stress on computa-
tional thresholds that might prompt this redundancy. We also study a naive cost-benefit balance
for duplicated circuits implementing complex phenotypes. From this we derive phase diagrams
and (phase-like) transitions between single and duplicated circuits, which constrain evolutionary
paths to complex cognition. Back to the big picture, similar phase diagrams and transitions
might constrain I/O and internal connectivity patterns of neural circuits at large. The formalism
of statistical mechanics seems a natural framework for thsi worthy line of research.
Keywords: duplicated neural circuits, brain symmetry, brain asymmetry, lateralization, statistical mechanics of
neural circuits
I. INTRODUCTION
Statistical mechanics determines the abundance of different patterns of matter according to cost-benefit calculations.
In the simplest cases, structures that minimize their internal energy and maximize their entropy are more likely
observed than other kinds of matter arrangements. More complex scenarios require additional chemical potentials
that must be optimized as well – by combining concentrations of different molecules across space, resulting in richer
patterns. As external parameters (pressure, temperature, etc.) are varied, the most likely arrangements of matter
might change smoothly of radically – in what we know as phase transitions. By mapping optimal structures over such
relevant dimensions we obtain phase diagrams that help us understand what arrangements of matter to expect under
distinct circumstances.
The appearance of life has been (qualitatively) described as a phase transition [1, 2]. It would take place as
relationships between thermodynamic potentials overcame a complexity threshold. After this, a preferred pattern of
matter consists of self-replicating entities (Figure 1a) that can jump-start Darwinian evolution [3]. Then, natural
selection raises the bar of the thermodynamic cost-benefit requirements: stable patterns of matter in the biosphere
not only need to be thermodynamically favored, they also need to win a fitness contest (Figure 1b. As a consequence,
structures within organisms often operate close to thermodynamic limits (e.g. of effective information processing and
work extraction [2, 4, 5]). Despite the added layer of complexity, statistical physics remains a very apt language
to describe some biological processes [6–10]: cell cycles can be studied as thermodynamic cycles [11–13], aspects
of organisms might stem from an effective free energy minimization (i.e. yet another cost-benefit balance) [14],
and variation along relevant dimensions (e.g. organism size vs metabolic load) determines the viability of key living
structures, which can be terminated abruptly as in phase transitions [15, 16]. An organism’s computational complexity,
which enables its cognition, is another one such key dimension. Many essential aspects of life rely on information
processing mechanisms such as memory, error correction, information transfer, etc., resulting in a central role for
computation in biology and Darwinism [2, 17–30]. And, once again, statistical physics plays a paramount role in
computation, e.g., by setting limits to efficient implementation of algorithms [31–36].
Cognition is possible in organisms without neurons [37–41]; however, nerve cells are the keystone of cognitive
complexity. Within the previous framework we wonder how to elaborate a biologically grounded statistical physics
of neural circuits (Figure 1c). This should bring known thermodynamic aspects of computation into a Darwinian
framework where cognition serves biological function [29, 42–46] – eventually, to balance metabolic costs and extract
free energy from an environment for an organism’s advantage. Such theory would dictate the abundance of different
kinds of circuits; or which kinds of brains to expect under fixed thermodynamic, computational, and Darwinian
conditions. For example, it could tell whether, under some set circumstances, brains are likely to have a solid substrate
(such as the cortex or laptops [37]) or a liquid substrate (such as ants, termites, or the immune system [37, 46, 47]).
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FIG. 1 Towards a statistical physics of neural circuits. a Some thermodynamic engines can use free energy to shape
matter as a replica of themselves. b Such self-replicating patterns can kick-start Darwinian evolution, deeply altering the
optimality of different phases of matter. Efficient replicators are favored and their internal arrangement become subject
of detailed optimization. c Neural circuits enable complex cognition in self-replicating patterns. Accordingly, they become
subjected to evolutionary-thermodynamic pressures eventually measured by their performance in a computational landscape.
Varying external parameters (e.g. computational task, energetic constraints...) renders phase diagrams for neural architectures.
d Phase diagram derived derived from [55]. Neural circuits recover from injuries by using i) costly redundant connections or
ii) paying a metabolic cost for regeneration. Three phases emerge: two where either one of the two strategies is preferred, and
one the computational phenotype never emerges. Transitions between phases constraint evolutionary paths. e Grid cells span
the available room with shorter (black) or larger (gray) periods to create exhaustive spatial representations. Place cells (blue)
encode specific locations. The spiking of each cell type is shown along the mouse’s trajectory. f Reconstruction of archetypal
cortical columns by Oberlaender et al. reconstruction methods in [165].
We could also derive phase diagrams saying when computing units behaving as reservoirs (as in Reservoir Computing
[49–54]) are more efficient [48], or whether redundancy or regeneration is a favored strategy to overcome neural damage
[55] (Figure 1d).
The task is big but some efforts are underway [5, 35–37, 46–48, 55, 56]. We can come up with prominent dimensions
that capture essential aspects of partial problems. Besides the metabolic cost of neural circuits: the complexity of the
organism’s interaction with its environment, reflected by i) richness of input signals and ii) generated output behavior;
as well as iii) internal organizing principles needed to carry out the relevant computations. Our hope is that effective
thermodynamic-like potentials might emerge and thus reduce the problem to simple cost-benefit calculations again.
Building a statistical physics of neural circuits at large is out our scope here, but that framework guides and inspires
our research. We focus on a much narrower question: What is the fate of duplicated neural circuits? Given some
metabolic constraints and computational needs, is a duplicated neural structure stable? Or is it so redundant that
it becomes metabolically unjustified? Can two duplicated circuits interact with each other to alter the available
computational landscape? How does this affect the evolutionary path further taken by each symmetric counterpart?
Can we capture some of these aspects with simple cost-benefit tradeoffs, thus building phase diagrams to reveal
evolutionary transitions?
To better ground the problem in actual biology, in section II we collect examples of neural duplicities in Central
Nervous Systems (CNS). The list is not exhaustive. The examples were chosen because of their prominence, because
they pose open neuroscientific problems, or because we wish to explore interesting ideas about them. Sometimes the
duplicity is explicit (a same circuit appears twice in our brains), sometimes it is subtler (a task is implemented twice
by different structures, perhaps in different ways – thus, why this phenotypic redundancy and how is it achieved?).
3Throughout, we wonder what conditions (usually, of computational complexity) might support this duplicity or trigger
its evolution in a phase-like transition. In section III model a simple case through naive cost-benefit tradeoffs. These
result in actual phase diagrams with transitions that we can calculate explicitly. These diagrams inform us about
possible evolutionary paths towards computationally complex phenotypes. These are novel results further investigated
elsewhere [57]. In section IV we bring models, results, and examples together into the big picture exposed in this
introduction.
II. A SHOWCASE OF DUPLICATED NEURAL STRUCTURES
A. The two hemispheres
The two brain hemispheres come readily to mind as duplicated neural structures. Broadly, the brain presents
bilaterality with two large, mirror-symmetric halves [58, 59]. Their symmetry likely stems from the body plan of
bilateralians [60] – non-bilateralian ‘brains’ present other symmetries [61, 62]. Part of the correspondence between
the body plan and the brain is still explicit in the somatosensory and motor cortices, which contain explicit represen-
tations of body parts ordered contiguously in the brain roughly as in the body [63]. But evidence from lesions and
hemispherectomies shows that the brain’s bilateral symmetry might be redundant. Individuals who lose a hemisphere
(especially young ones) can often regain control of both bilateral body sides with the halved brain alone, as well as
implement other critical tasks [64–70, 72].
A more careful examination further dismantles the appearance of bilateral symmetry in the brain [58, 71, 73, 74].
One hemisphere motor-dominates the other, resulting in a more skilled contralateral part of the body [74]. Usually,
the dominant hemisphere also houses all prominent language centers [73, 75–81]. The areas were these centers could
dwell (see next subsection) are thicker in the language-dominant side, resulting in macroscopically visible asymmetries.
Primary visual cortices are fairly symmetrical, but visual processing higher up in the hierarchy is somehow lateralized
[58, 82, 83]. The visual system is usually larger in the motor-dominated hemisphere [58].
In humans, more often the left hemisphere motor-dominates, resulting in right-handedness. The typical brain
presents developed language centers at the left as well, and enlarged visual cortices at the right [58]. When the
dominance is reversed, the brain is mirror-symmetric to the typical one – i.e. a swap of dominance does not result in
major disturbances of the neural architecture [58, 73]. But excessively symmetric brains correlate with pathologies such
as aphasia [73, 84]. What are the reasons behind this lateralization of certain tasks? Some unsettled discussion exists
as to whether more complex cognitive function correlates with lateralized brains [85]. Is lateralization a prerequisite
for the emergence of certain traits, or does it follow from their evolution? How might an excess of symmetry (i.e.
faithfully duplicated neural circuits) result detrimental [86]? These questions appear related to symmetry breaking
phenomena, which are thoroughly characterized statistical by physics tools [87, 88]. Can we incorporate this formalism
into a computational and Darwinian framework to describe symmetry breaking in the brain?
B. The perisylvan network for human language
The discovery of Broca’s area was a milestone in the understanding of the brain [58]. It offered definitive proof that
different cortical parts take care of distinct functions, and that both hemispheres are not equal. Human language
is lateralized, typically with most prominent language-specific circuitry at the motor-dominant hemisphere. This
circuitry is located around the Sylvian fissure [75–81]. It includes the Broca and Wernicke areas, among others, and
interfaces abundantly with motor and auditory cortices. The language-dominated hemisphere lacks these structures
and the thick wiring connecting them. Both hemispheres are more symmetric at birth [73, 81, 89]. Evidence suggests
that similar circuits exist at either side in newborns, and that both react to speech as soon as day 2 (even with a
preponderant reaction on the right side) [89]. Presumably, only the circuits at the dominant side mature into the
fully lateralized perysilvan langauge network. Some adult brains are less lateralized, developing seemingly symmetric
circuitry at both sides. Such brains more often present language pathologies [73, 84]. This strongly suggests that
a duplicity of language circuits is counterproductive. Might this be due to a conflicting interference between two
candidates for language production [86]?
Normal language development thus suggests that it is convenient to lose some of the innate duplicity. But clinical
cases of language recovery after hemispherectomy or injury of the dominant side suggest that enough redundancy can
persist in the dominated hemisphere. These studies show that children who lost their matured language centers can
grow them anew in the opposite side, and that this is easier the earlier that the intervention or injury takes place
[64, 67–70, 72, 90]. A mainstream explanation of this capability posits that the brain is more plastic at younger
ages, thus a potential to reconstruct language remains. This plasticity would be gradually lost, eventually preventing
4fully functional language from regrowing in the dominated hemisphere. This would suggest that the duplicity of
neural circuitry related to language is not realized, but potential. However, when fully functional language develops
after hemispherectomy or injury, the corresponding centers do not establish themselves in arbitrary places, but in the
corresponding Wernicke, Broca, etc. territories of the dominated sides. Some duplicity, a blueprint of the missing
circuits, must exist to guide this process. How is this latent duplicity balanced to prevent unhealthy interferences in
healthy brains?
C. Internalizing the control of movement
Rodolfo Llina´s suggested that the evolutionary history of the CNS is that of the progressive “encephalization” of
motor rhythms [91, 92]. We can find living fossils of some stages in a range of species, including ours. The earliest
circuits for motor control, still present in Cnidarian and others, dwelt right under the skin [61]. Some arthropods have
decentralized ganglia to coordinate their motion [93, 94]. Much simpler ganglia still take care of fast reflexes in most
other species [95]. As we progress towards more complex brains, movement coordination is centralized and layers of
control are added. In reptiles, birds, and mammals, the brain stem coordinates several stereotyped behaviors – e.g.
gait, chewing, breathing, or digesting [96]. The voluntary aspect of these and other, more complex tasks originates
at subcortical centers or motor cortices.
In this process, new structures take over tasks previously managed by simpler neural centers. Whenever this
happens, some overlap in function exists. Eventually, the older control structures become controlled by the newer
ones. They might lose some of its complexity (e.g. ganglia controlling reflexes in mammals). In any case, they enable
a hierarchical control exerted from the top. This requires that a dialog be successfully established across levels. The
brain stem plays a paramount role in this sense: It works as a Central Pattern Generator [92, 96, 97] that translates
signals from higher up centers into salient electric waveforms that activate motor neurons in an orderly manner –
thus establish, e.g., gait rhythms. Transition between different gaits (walk, trot, gallop, etc.) is discrete, as is the
transition between the patterns generated at the brain stem.
Throughout the motor control hierarchy, the resolution of simpler tasks coarse grains them so that they become
building blocks for the next level. Similar phenomenology is currently under active research in information theory,
through the study of coarse grained symbolic dynamics [98–107]. What triggers the emergence of new layers of control
in this hierarchy? Is this externally motivated – e.g. because a new range of behaviors becomes available and more
complex control is needed? Or internally – e.g. because an increased computational power of the CNS prompts a
reorganization [108]? The statistical physics of coarse grained symbolic dynamics might shed some light in these
questions, as well as research on robot control [96].
D. Place and grid cells – a twofold representation of space?
Both grid and place cells represent space [109–111]. Grid cells are located in the medial entorhinal cortex. They
build an exhaustive representation of the available room [111–113]. Each grid cell encodes space periodically such
that its receptive fields are the nodes of a grid with fixed spatial period (Figure 1e). Different grid cells use different
periodicity and phase such that each point is uniquely encoded by the spiking of confluent nodes. Place cells are
located in the Hippocampus. Instead of responding periodically over space, they code specific, individual spots – a
single place. They can also code for salient elements in a landscape or more extended areas – e.g. the length along a
boundary.
Why this duplicitous space representation? Is it needed, convenient, or redundant? Did it emerge as each structure
specialized in some specific aspect of spatial coding? In this sense, grid cells have been associated to path integration
[111–117], indispensable to keep track when external cues are missing. And place cells relate to episodic memory,
memory retrieval, and consolidation of trajectories [116, 118, 119]. They also integrate non-spatial modal information
[120].
We entertain a complementary possible origin about the necessity of a twofold space representation. Our hypothesis
is compatible with other jobs for both cell types. In [121], movement planning is solved as a constraint satisfaction
problem. Networks of spiking neurons are extremely apt at quickly finding great solutions to such problems [122, 123],
but only if we manage to encode the constraints in the neural network topology. Different neurons in the network
become the embodiment of causal variables of the problem. Their firing represents different combinations of the
problem’s variables – i.e. candidate solutions for the constraint satisfaction. As neurons repress or activate each
other (as dictated by the network’s wiring), they test candidate solutions against the problem’s constraints. To
encode movement planning like this, a two-fold representation is needed [121]: first, an exhaustive representation
of the available room; second, an encoding of relevant elements that act as constraints (e.g. walls that cannot be
5traversed, goals that offer a reward when reached). The first representation acts as a virtual space upon which external
constraints or internalized goals can be uploaded. Both representations interact to generate ordered spiking patterns
representing candidate trajectories. Optimal paths satisfy the problem’s constraints, avoiding obstacles and reaching
goals.
It is tempting to assign grid cells the role of a virtual, all encompassing space representation. Place cells could
then impose constraints derived from internal goals or external cues. In [121], the virtual space is a square grid with
one neuron per grid position. This requires ∼ N neurons to encode the N discrete locations. It is more efficient to
represent the N sites with a binary code, which uses around ∼ log(N) neurons. This is achieved by neurons coding
position periodically, just as grid cells do. Thus, grid cells build efficient representations of the available room [111] –
disregarding of their role in our constraint satisfaction scheme.
Regarding place cells: they respond to landscapes, to stimuli in the environment, to non-spatial features such
as odors, directionality, etc. [120, 124, 125]. Their firing can change as a response of environment manipulations
[119, 124, 126]. This remapping can happen due to the change of a location’s relevance in an ongoing task [127].
Firing can also be modulated by specific behaviors (e.g. sniffing) at a location [128]. Place cells have also been
assigned a predictive role, as they engage in mechanisms relevant for reinforcement learning [129, 130]. For example,
consecutive place cells representing a path are known to fire sequentially before that path is taken – thus preplaying it
[116, 131, 132]. An already traveled path is also replayed once a destination is reached, potentially allocating rewards
[116]. The hippocampus contains populations explicitly encoding goals and rewards [133, 134]. All these features are
ideal for hippocampal cells (and specifically places cell) to represent constraints (objectives, destinations, places to
avoid, etc.) to be uploaded onto the virtual room representation of grid cells, just as in [121]. This hypothesis is a
beautiful way forward to understand our navigation system, and how its different parts come together as a distributed
algorithm. Some ongoing research seems to point in this direction [112, 129, 130].
E. Somatosensory and motor cortices
Evidence from extant animals indicates that the earliest neocortical structures dealt mostly with sensory input
[135, 136], with prominent roles for visual, auditory, and olfactory modes. Somatosensory cortices evolved earlier than
their motor counterparts. The most evolutionarily ancient, extant mammal species (e.g. opossums) seem to lack a
motor cortex [137]. The corresponding (rather poorly developed) motor functions are handled by the somatosensory
cortex itself [135–137] or by thalamic centers [135, 138]. A primary motor cortex appears with placental mammals
[135, 136, 139]. The number and complexity of devoted motor cortical areas grows as we approach our closest
relatives [135, 136] – notably, first, due to the motor-visual integration demanded by tasks such as reaching or
grasping [135, 136, 140, 141].
If we want to build an effective controller of a complex system (e.g. a cortex to handle a body with many parts)
it is a mathematical necessity that the controller has to be a good model of the system itself [142]. We might think
of somatosensory areas as the model within the larger (brain-wide) controller. This suggests that the evolution of
somatosensory and motor areas must be intertwined, and that somatosensory maps should predate complex motor
control. But, why does a dedicated motor cortex appear eventually if motor control could already be handled by
somatosensory centers [135–137]? What evolutionary pressures prompted this emancipation of the motor areas? Does
the motor cortex rely on the somatosensory cortex for the modeling needed for control? Or do motor areas develop
their own modeling? If so, how does this differ from the representation in somatosensory areas? How much modeling
redundancy exists in both these physically separated cortices?
We have chosen the somatosensory–motor axis, but we might ask similar questions about redundancy in somatosen-
sory areas as well. They accommodate coexisting parallel representations of the same body parts [135, 136, 143]. What
prompted this abundance of duplicated circuits? How did they emerge? Is there something about the computational
nature of the task (body representation and motor control) that favors such coexistence of redundant circuits?
F. Reactive versus predictive brains
In [144] Andy Clark defends the predictive brain hypothesis – also studied as predictive coding [145–148]. According
to this view, complex brains do not stay idle, awaiting external inputs. Instead, they embody generative models
that continuously put forward theories about how external environments look like. Representations built by those
generative models would flow from high in a cognitive hierarchy towards the sensory cortices. There, they would be
confronted with external signals captured by the senses. These signals would correct mismatches and further tune
those aspects of the generated representation that were broadly correct. In predictive brains, input signals would still
be necessary, but not as the main actors that build complex percepts. Instead, they would merely serve as an error
6correction mechanism to contrast the generated models. What flows upwards in the hierarchy are the discriminating
errors that need to be discounted in the generated representations [146–152].
Advanced visual systems are a favorite example [145–147]. Again, higher cognitive centers elaborate hypotheses
about a current scene. The generated representation flows from cortices that suggest shapes and locations for distinct
objects, down into primary visual cortices that hypothesize about the location and orientation of these object’s edges.
There, the input stream is discounted, making no correction if the hypotheses flowing top-down are correct. Otherwise,
discriminant errors (signaling, e.g., misaligned edges, mismatching 3-D shapes, etc.) make their way bottom-up until
they tighten the right screws across the visual hierarchy. A similar confrontation would happen at each interface
between levels in this hierarchy. Some empirical evidence supports this view of complex visual systems [146, 147, 150].
Some Machine Learning approaches draw inspiration from the predictive brain hypothesis [153–155]. However,
historically, most mainstream Artificial Neural Networks for vision or scene recognition work in a revere fashion
[156, 157]. Visual representations are generated from scratch as the input (processed sequentially from the bottom
up) reaches the distinct layers. We term this a reactive brain. The wiring of reactive brains is simpler than that of
predictive brains. The former only need to convey information in one direction, while the later need to allow two:
generative model outputs flow top-down and correcting errors climb bottom-up. If cognitively advanced brains are
predictive, rather than reactive, they need to harbor duplicated circuitry to support the bidirectional flow. Interesting
questions arise:
• Is there a threshold of cognitive complexity beyond which predictive brains always pay off? Protozoa reacting
to gradients for chemotaxis hardly need a model of possible distributions of chemicals. The ability to dream in
complex brains reveals the existence of generative models. When did they become favored?
• What environments are more likely to select for predictive brains? Picture a scene that varies wildly over time,
often showing new inputs that a brain could hardly imagine based on previous experience. The cost of correcting
hypotheses from generative models might be unbearable. Building representations anew from each incoming
input (just as in deep neural networks) might be cheaper. Similarly, a pressure to anticipate the environment
(e.g. to react to looming dangers) must be important – otherwise, reactive brains would do just as well and are
cheaper.
• How did the duplicated circuitry needed for predictive brains emerge? Was a same system duplicated and
reversed? Did, instead, a structure dedicated to error propagation grow over a previously existing scaffold,
reversing the flow of information as it expanded? Is there a site in a cognitive hierarchy in which the predictive
stance is more easily adopted, and hence the needed circuitry expands from there? Or did both flow directions
of predictive brains evolve simultaneously since early? This later possibility demands that even simple brains
allow the predictive way of working, which might be possible [158–161]. Note that complex brains might also
work in a reactive manner if needed – as reflexes do in advanced nervous systems [95].
We suspect that some answers to these questions might be constrained by information theory limits to channel
capacity and error correction. Numerical evaluations of performances of reactive versus diffusive circuits under different
computational conditions seems affordable. This would help us build phase diagrams and characterize transitions
between these brain classes.
G. The cortical column
Rather than a duplicated neural structure we look at a multiplicated one. The Cortical Column (CC) [165] (Figure
1f) has been proposed as a basic computing unit of the mammalian brain [162, 163]. Hypothetically, evolution
stumbled upon this complex circuit so apt for advanced cognition that it was “manufactured” en masse, eventually
populating the whole neocortex [162, 163]. This story is appealing, but there is no consensus around it [164].
Single CCs have been used as a model reservoir since the inception of Reservoir Computing [49–54]. A reservoir
is a highly non-linear dynamical system that projects input signals into large-dimensional spaces. In them, different
input features become easy to separate from one another. Within this framework, a CC would not be task-specific,
but rather work as a generic reservoir that separates potentially meaningful features of arbitrary inputs. Other,
dedicated circuits would be tasked with selecting the relevant information from among all the insights that a CC
makes available. This would make CCs very versatile computing units, as they can be adapted to different purposes
and even implement different functions simultaneously [49].
Evidence of computing principles compatible with reservoir-like behavior in CCs is scarce [48, 166–169]. In con-
trast, there is abundant evidence of task-specificity. CCs morphology and abundance varies across the cortex, likely
influenced by their computational idiosyncrasies. The mouse whisker barrel cortex is an extreme example. Individ-
ual CCs of this cortex have grown and thickened through evolution to take care of the somatosensory processing of
7each whisker [164, 170]. The purported versatility of CCs (including this capacity to commit to a task and change
morphology over evolutionary time), make them an interesting candidate, as a computing unit, to test the ideas
exposed in the Introduction [48]: What is the steady shape and dynamics of a CC under fixed computational and
thermodynamic (energetic, input entropy, etc.) constraints? Under which conditions does a CC remain reservoir-like
– thus task-versatile? What conditions, instead, prompt their evolution towards task-specific forms? What might trig-
ger their multiplicity across the neocortex? Theoretical advance seems plausible through relatively simple computer
simulations. From the empirical side, CCs across species and cortical areas seem real-life versions of the proposed
experiments.
III. SIMPLE MODELS FOR A COMPLEX RESEARCH LINE
The examples just reviewed show promising intersections between statistical physics, information theory, and the
evolutionary origin and fate of duplicated neural structures. In this section we develop specific models that capture
tradeoffs of circuit topology and computational complexity. Through these, we build phase diagrams – explicitly in
subsection III.A and qualitative in section III.B.
A. A naive cost-efficiency model of duplicated circuitry for complex tasks
An advantage of duplicated neural circuits can be a robustness against mistakes, but in turn we need to pay
twice a metabolic cost [171, 172]. The difficulty of coordinating both circuits [171, 173, 174] and long, expensive
connections (e.g. across hemispheres) [136] have been proposed as additional costs favoring task lateralization – hence
pushing against the evolutionary stability of duplicated circuits). Assume an emergent, complex task that relies on
the successful computation of a number of subtasks. Take language, which requires the correct implementation of
syntax, semantics, motor coordination, etc. Further assume that, historically, our brain has evolved two parallel
neural structures (SL and SR, each one in a hemisphere), each of them with the capacity to implement every subtask.
Considering the costs and benefits outlined above: When does it pay off to keep both structures? When is it more
convenient to employ only one (i.e. to break the bilateral symmetry)? Are there cases in which some degree of
lateralization is more convenient? Let us attempt a naive calculation.
Each structure can potentially implement each of the K0 subtasks. However, SL only takes on KL, and SR only
takes on KR of them. The probability that each structure implements a specific subtask is κL/R = KL/R/K0 respec-
tively. There is a small chance, ε, that each structure implements wrong each of its subtasks, but each independent,
correct implementation reports a fitness reward b, disregarding of whether the computation happened in SL or SR.
If only one of the structures takes care of a specific subtask, it runs smoothly; but if both sides attempt to solve a
same computation, they might interfere. We assume a third circuit (with an associated cost to be discounted later)
that can always select the right output if at least one of the redundant structures has produced it. The total benefit
reported by all subtasks reads:
B = K0b
[
(1− ε)κL (1− κR) + (1− ε) (1− κL)κR + (1− ε2)κLκR] . (1)
There is a trivial cost c for each subtask implemented in each of the structures:
C = cK0(1− ε) (κL + κR) . (2)
Note that this is higher if the parts need to be more reliable (i.e. if ε is smaller). Finally, the coordination cost, cˆ,
needs to be paid for each duplicated computation:
Cˆ = cˆK0κLκR. (3)
The resulting utility function (normalized by K0) reads:
ρ = (1− ε)b [κL(1− κR) + (1− κL)κR + (1 + ε)κLκR]− (1− ε)c (κL + κR)− cˆκLκR. (4)
So far each subtask reports an individual, independent benefit, even if other computations fail. Thus equation 4
does not capture the cost-benefit of the emergent phenotype, but rather of pre-adaptations that can lead to it. The
composed phenotype will only report a benefit if all subtasks are correctly implemented. In that case, the contributed
benefit reads:
B˜ = bK0 · (1− ε)K0 [κL(1− κR) + (1− κL)κR + (1 + ε)κLκR]K0 . (5)
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FIG. 2 Phases of single and duplicated neural structures. a Phase diagram shows parameter combinations where single
(darker) or duplicated (lighter) are preferred when subcircuits are not cooperating towards an emerging phenotype. b Phase
diagram when subcircuits cooperate towards an emergent phenotype. A new phase exists in which no circuit is implemented at
all (white). c Superposing both phase diagrams reveals evolutionary paths for the emergence of the complex phenotype from
pre-adaptations. Depending on metabolic costs and fitness contributions, its emergence might be blocked (white) or demand
that a single circuit gets duplicated. Blue paths indicate necessary changes in external (metabolic and efficiency) conditions
for an evolutionary path that takes us from a bilateral to a lateralized structure.
We made the maximum benefit that can be cashed in (bK0) proportional to the phenotype’s complexity, which is a
non-trivial assumption.
We assume b = 1 without loss of generality, and a fixed cost c = 0.1. Optimizing both utility functions we obtain the
phase diagrams from figure 2. They tells us what structures to expect depending on a series of metabolic (energetic)
costs linked to successful information processing. A first important result is that neither equation admits graded
solutions: either both structures are kept, or one, or none. This naive account does not support a backup structure
that takes care of partial computations. If each individual subtask contributes a fitness independent of all others
(equation 4), it always pays off to implement either one or both structures (Figure 2a). This is not the case for the
emergent phenotype: in its phase diagram (Figure 2b) for a broad region of parameters it never pays off to build any
structure at al.
Superposing both phase diagrams (Figure 2c) reveals evolutionary paths for transitions into the novel, complex
phenotype. For a broad region, the complex phenotype cannot be accessed (labeled “No emergence” in Figure 2c).
For the rest of the diagram there is a direct evolutionary path towards the emergent phenotype. This includes cases in
which bilateral structures remain in place (“Bilateral to bilateral” in Figure 2c) and cases in which a single structure
(already optimal for the subtasks) implements the emergent phenotype on its own (“Lateral to lateral” in Figure
2c). Notably, this naive tradeoff never shows a bilateral structure that becomes lateralized as the complex phenotype
emerges. To observe such a transition we would need to move around the phase diagram – i.e. the new emergent
phenotype must change ε or cˆ (blue curves in Figure 2c). This might happen, e.g., if the complexity of the emergent
phenotype imposes a higher reliability (lower ε) for all the parts, or if coordination becomes more costly – e.g. because
less discrepancies are tolerated).
B. The garden of forking neural tissues
In an outstanding, broad region of the phase diagram (“Lateral to bilateral” in Figure 2c), it is favored that a single
structure develops into two when a high fitness can be gained by the emergent phenotype. Such a feat is difficult if
we think about a cloned structure emerging ex nihilo in the opposing hemisphere. But let us drop the labels (‘left’,
‘right’, ‘lateral’, ‘bilateral’) for a moment. Instead think of an array of disparate but neighboring circuits implementing
different subtasks. They are presented an evolutionary chance to cooperate towards an emergent phenotype. Our cost-
benefit study reveals a broad collection of scenarios that would favor the duplication of these circuits into symmetric,
redundant neural structures. Now that we are not thinking in terms of hemispheres (our analysis still holds), this
duplication might be a copy/paste of a patch of neocortex, the development of identical cortical columns, etc. These
modifications are ontogenically plausible. Perhaps some of the duplicated neural structures from section II came
about through this naive mechanism. However they emerged, once they are are in place nothing prevents them from
evolving further. This can happen, e.g., because external pressures keep changing, or because a new (previously
unaccessible) aspect of the emergent phenotype is explored. Either possibility might demand more or less efficient
implementations of each subtask, perhaps making both copies of each module specialize in the processing of some
input subset. Conditions might also reverse such that one of the redundant structures is lost again.
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FIG. 3 A morphospace to sort neural circuits following computational constraints. This is a speculative map in
which three dimensions of relevance to computational problems were chosen to help us segregate and sort out different neural
structures. Other dimensions might be more adequate for the problem at hand – e.g. while reactive and predictive brains are
squeezed into the morphospace, likely we need a dimension of input self-similarity over time to better understand such divide.
In general, what is the evolutionary fate of a duplicated neural tissue as learning or Darwinian selection press on?
How does this fate depend on the task at hand? For example, how does it change with the complexity of the input
signals or of the desired output? How does it vary with the complexity of the input-output mapping?
Let us picture the simplest gedankenexperiment to tackle these questions: Take a single neuron that implements
a specific function. It receives weighted inputs from some sources (potentially including itself, thus recurrence is
allowed). Its output feeds into a set of ‘actuators’ to produce some function, which results from a weighted sum of the
neuron’s output as well. Now let us duplicate this neuron precisely (same weights at the in-, self-, and out-synapses)
and let us add a few random links between the (now two) neurons. Next, let us feed them a stream of inputs while
implementing some plasticity rule (e.g. spike-timing dependent plasticity [175]). Of course, let this plasticity be
influenced by the fitness of the resulting behavior (via the actuators). Correct implementation (e.g. of the previous,
or of a new, emerging cognitive phenotype) should reinforce the connections that produced it. Wrong implementations
should penalize the corresponding weights.
What happens to the duplicated neurons?
• Is one of them lost, thus reverting to the original configuration? Then, duplicating this structure was never
favorable in the first place. Do they help each other instead, achieving a more robust computation?
• Do they become respectively specialized in pre-processing the input and producing elaborated outputs? This
reminds us of the specialization of somatosensory and motor cortices, or of Wernicke’s and Broca’s area – rather
processing input and producing output syntax respectively.
• As the neuron is duplicated, the fitness landscape of computational possibilities changes. For example, it might
become feasible to implement the original function in a hierarchical fashion, as we have seen in motor control.
Might the neurons arrange themselves in a ‘controller-controlled’ architecture? Might them, instead, take care of
different subsets of the function – becoming effectively uncoupled? Or might they unlock previously unavailable
phenotypes, thus expanding the computational landscape?
Two duplicated neurons might be too simple a system and some options might be locked. What happens if,
instead, the duplicated neural structure is a small ganglion, a complete cortical column, or a whole patch of cortex?
Do new evolutionary paths become available beyond some complexity threshold of the duplicated substrate? Are
some configurations easier to achieve for simpler circuits, and others favored for more complex structures? Or does
the landscape of possibilities remain roughly similar to the one for the duplicated spiking neuron?
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Numerical experiments to shed some light on these questions are underway. Meanwhile, we single out dimensions
that are relevant for the problem. Final evolutionary paths will depend on the specific task at hand, but three
quantifiable aspects might stand out: i) the complexity, or intricacy, of input signals (KIN ); ii) the complexity, or
richness, of the sought behavior (KOUT ); and the complexity of the input-output mapping (KMAP ). These quantities
suggest a morphospace where we can locate some of the neural structures discussed above (Figure 3). Morphospaces
remind us of phase diagrams. They are less rigorous, but still useful tools to contemplate possible morphologies or
designs [176–183]. They sort out real data or architectures produced by models with respect to some magnitudes,
thus helping us compare structures to each other.
While speculative, we think that our example is a worthy exercise. We separated two large volumes of morphospace
that correspond to reactive vs. predictive brains. The former are mainly guided by input complexity, as their output
(a reaction) lags behind. They reduce the input richness into categorical responses. Some neural circuits fall in this
region: i) The brain-stem working as a Central Pattern Generator takes as input the motor behavior planned in higher
cortical areas and reduces it to sequences of stereotypical patterns that motor neurons easily understand. ii) Most
animal communication systems (far from the human faculty of language) also reduce a range of possible scenarios into
categorical responses that (opposed to human language) must be communicated without ambiguity [183–186].
Rather predictive brains require little input complexity to prompt varied cognitive responses. Some extremely
simple circuits implement predictive dynamics [158–161], but we assume that, in general, the I/O mapping (KMAP )
of predictive brains is more complex, as it can be context dependent. At the core of a predictive brain there are
generative models that produce a range of possibilities being constantly evaluated and corrected [144]. They must
present some recursivity, thus the interaction of the model’s state with itself would add to KMAP .
For three more examples we postulate similar and fairly high input and output complexity (KIN ∼ KOUT ) and
increasing mapping complexity (KMAP ). These are the representation of geometric space (with smaller KMAP ),
sensory-motor maps (intermediate KMAP ), and human language (largest KMAP ). Most likely, the navigation and
sensory-motor systems of different species present a range of KMAP . In any case, the sensory-motor and language
systems suggest that balanced KIN ∼ KOUT more easily leads to duplicated structures specializing, respectively, in
input pre-processing and rich output generation – perhaps above a certain KMAP threshold.
IV. DISCUSSION
Thermodynamics dictates the abundance of distinct matter phases through straightforward cost-benefit calculations
[187, 188]. In the simplest case, those patterns of molecule arrangements that minimize internal energy and maximize
entropy are more likely than others. The cost-benefit balance becomes more complex as other (e.g. chemical)
potentials enter the game. A transition to life and Darwinian evolution [1–3] raises the cost-benefit stakes: matter
patterns need to be thermodynamically favorable and win an evolutionary contest. Interestingly, the formalism of
statistical physics remains effective to describe phenomenology across biology and cognition [6–14, 31–36]. The later is
enabled by increased computational complexity, a prominent evolutionary player that allows an organism to integrate
and predict information from its environment [2, 17–30].
Deep down, a thermodynamically viable and evolutionary successful organism must: First, optimize its interface
with environmental inputs [189, 190] as well as its responding behavior, which can be greatly informed by the organ-
ism’s ability to predict its environment [29, 30]. Second, optimize its internal organization so that the input can be
mapped into the output as cheaply as possible. These optimizations entail minimizing metabolic costs, e.g., from heat
dissipation or entropy production. Some of these costs depend on information theoretical relationships between inputs
and outputs and are detached from the material implementation of a circuit [35, 36]. Ideally, we would write down
all the thermodynamic ingredients involved to calculate detailed balances of computations happening in candidate
neural structures. This would reveal which structures are more likely (i.e. more optimal in the eventual cost-benefit
balance) given a fixed set of computations to be implemented (i.e. sought cognitive phenotype), energetic affordances
and demands, and entropic losses.
This is often a cumbersome calculation – even for simple duplicated structures, on which this paper focuses. Our
showcase of examples from real brains illustrates how some relevant aspects of the problem are tightly linked to
the specific behavior that each circuit intends to implement. This means that the actual thermodynamic potentials
that need to be pondered depend largely on the circuit’s computational ends. But a clever abstraction might reveal
outstanding dimensions common to diverse phenotypes. Finding such coarse-grained, relevant dimensions would
allow us to build effective cost-benefit balances and effective phase diagrams. The mathematics of arbitrary, emergent
cost-benefit tradeoffs map back to the formalism of statistical mechanics [187, 188, 191–193]. Thus, different neural
structures can be captured by such phase diagrams and “phase” transitions (akin to thermodynamic ones) can be
uncovered. In our last example (section III.B) we chose complexity of the input/output mapping (KMAP ) and interface
with input signals (KIN ) and behavior (KOUT ) as such outstanding dimensions. Other optimal remain unexplored –
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e.g. correlations between past and future must be relevant for the emergence of predictive brains.
In the example that we work out explicitly (section III.A), those abstract dimensions translate into explicit costs
of building and coordinating subcircuits to compute an emergent task. The resulting utilitarian calculation reveals
conditions (of task complexity and energetic costs) under which single or duplicated neural structures are most optimal
(hence most likely). According to our naive study, transitions between both architectures might happen abruptly as
external constraints change – as in phase transitions. These external parameters might vary due to an organism
growing in size, increasing its energetic or computing efficiency, expanding its computational landscape, etc. The
uncovered transitions inform and constrain available evolutionary paths.
Statistical physics (and its phase transitions and diagrams, criticality, susceptibilities to external parameters, etc.)
appears as a very apt language to study the optimality and abundance of neural structures. Perhaps it is an un-
avoidable language. The task is big, but efforts are building up [5, 35–37, 46–48, 55, 56]. We hope to see important
developments soon, hopefully along empirical records of neural circuitry falling within the resulting phase diagrams.
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